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Drug Injury Compensation Plans
JO H N  G. FLEM ING*
Three countries have enacted statutes to compensate victims o f  the Tha­
lidomide tradgedy. The author not only canvasses these drug injury 
statutory plans but looks also at the different compensation techniques 
and their justification in light o f  the question whether preferential treat­
ment should be awarded to this group o f  accident victims.
Afin de compenser les victimes de la thalidomide, on a promulgé des bis 
comportant cette tragédie dans trois pays. L'auteur non seulement ex­
amine à fon d  les dispositions statutaires, mais il étudil également les 
techniques de compensation diverses en tant que justification au problème 
d ’accorder des traitements préférentiels à ces victimes.
T h e Thalidom ide tragedy o f the early 1960’s left a searing and cata­
clysmic impression on the public mind throughout the world.1 In its after­
math, public sorrow and anger became widely engaged over the question 
o f compensating the pitiful victims o f the ill-fated drug and helped to 
mobilize concern for the future provision o f drug-related injuries.2 So far 
three countries —  West Germany, Sweden and Japan —  have enacted 
special statutes to this end.
♦Ediior-in-Chief. This is an expanded version o f the Vicount Bennett Lecture, delivered at the University 
of New Brunswick, Canada on March 30, 1982. Shannon Cecil Turner Professor of Law, University o f 
California. Berkeley; formerly Dean and Robert Garran Professor of Law, Canberra University College; 
o f Lincoln's Inn.
‘Inside Team of the Sunday Tim e o f London, Suffer the Children: The Story o f Thalidomide, (1979). Sjostrom 
and Nielsson, Thalidomide and the Power o f The Drug Companies. (1972).
2"T h eir plight and their impact on public opinion, have probably done more to cause a re-examination of 
some o f the basic features o f our legal system than any other recent single disaster." Dworkin, “Pearson's 
Implications for Severely-handicapped Children and Products Liability." Allen, Bourn & Holyoak. Accident 
Compensation After Pearson, (1979) 160. In Britain, public reaction prompted the request to the Law Com­
mission to consider products liability (1971) and prenatal injury (1972) as well as the appointment o f the 
Pearson Commission (1972). In the U.S. thalidomide was a major factor behind the 1962 amendments of 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, introducing inter alia the requirement o f “effectiveness”: Temin, Taking 
Your Medicine: Drug Regulation m the U.S. (1980) 123-24.
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i propose to discuss, first, these three special plans, each o f which 
reflects a different compensation technique typical o f the country’s legal 
culture, and second, the transcendent question as to the legitimacy o f sin­
gling out for preferential treatment this, jarticular group o f the disabled.
TH E SPECIAL PLANS
T h e experience in settling the thalidomide claims cast a long shadow 
on future planning. Most pervasive seems to have been the recognition 
that public sentiment will not in the long run condone the heavy expend­
itures o f adversary litigation or indeed protracted settlement negotiations. 
In Sweden, the Astra firm disclaimed at an early stage any desire to dispute 
the controversial issues o f causality and forseeability, but in most o f the 
other countries the longer delays in effecting settlements (from 1961 to 
the early 70 ’s) were not uninfluenced by dickering over legal responsibility. 
Indeed, in England, the first batch o f settled claims was originally dis­
counted to 40%  in the light o f legal infirmities, including doubts concerning 
responsibility for prenatal injuries,3 but the subsequent intense public ag­
itation surrounding an additional 250 claimants eventually forced the de­
fendants to a quick and fairer resolution.
’ In Germany where the number o f victims was largest, residual public 
responsibility to the victims was reflected in two subsequent governmental 
contributions to the compensation fund which the manufacturer had set 
up to the absolute limits o f its financial capacity.4 In Japan, the state was 
implicated from the start as legally responsible for licensing the drug and, 
as such, participated in the settlement itself with many claimants.5
West Germany
West Germany was at once the center o f the thalidomide affair and 
the scene o f the strongest European pharmaceutical industry. T he origi­
nator o f the drug was a German firm (though its distributors and licensees 
were spread among several countries) and the number o f victims (2,500) 
associated with this firm was by far the largest. The prolonged criminal
'Bennett, "Liability of Manufacturers o f Thalidomide", (1965) 39 Austr. L. J .  265. Since resolved by the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976.
* Supra, footnote 1, Suffer the Children, at 126; A rineimittelprobleme in Deutschland und Japan, (1980), at 98 
(hereinafter cited as Arznemittelprubleme). The federal government gave two reasons: first, that the federal 
republic was a social welfare state (SouaLslaat)-, second, that the time of marketing thalidomide such phar­
maceutical injuries had been unforseeable and that this accounted for the failure to pass a stricter licensing 
law. The latter reason explains why the benefits were limited to this special group of victims, without 
violating the constitutional requirement o f equal protection. See Wartensleben. Arznemittelprubleme at 123 
(summary o f discussion).
5The State's legal responsibility in the drug cases is explained by Abe. “Probleme der Arzneimittelgesetz- 
gebung in Japan,” Arzneimittelprobleme at 63-70.
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proceedings against the firm6 continued to focus the attention o f the public 
and the affected industry on the physical and financial risks o f novel drugs. 
Not surprisingly, Germany also became the scene o f the first serious efforts 
to rethink the problem o f compensating drug victims. This process yielded 
important insights, both into alternative structurings o f a compensation 
scheme and into the substantive problem of defining the scope o f the 
compensable risks.
Structure
Several proposals preceeded the eventual compensation scheme.7 The 
firsts draft, submitted in December 1973 by the federal Ministry o f Health, 
proposed a three-tracked scheme: ordinary tort liability for negligence, a 
new strict liability limited by maxima but including non-pecuniary loss, and 
a compensation fund in case the claimant could not plausibly obtain sat­
isfaction from a legally responsible defendant or an insurer. T h e idea o f 
no-fault liability in limited amounts followed the traditional German pat­
tern o f strict liability statutes for selected “abnormally dangerous activities”,8 
such as railways, utilities, automobiles and nuclear installations.9 In turn, 
the idea o f a subsidiary fund financed by the pharmaceutical industry 
followed the familiar model o f uninsured motorist funds in France10 and 
G erm any" and had gained some academic support for the general problem 
o f products liability.12
Not surprisingly, the industry did not welcome this proposal. It ob­
jected both to the extra financial burden implicit in strict liability and to 
the absence o f any participation by the state which the industry demanded 
because o f the state’s role as licensing authority for pharmaceutical prod­
ucts. This first proposal was therefore soon superseded, in Ju n e 1974, by 
a Cabinet draft which proposed a simpler, two-tracked pattern: aside from 
negligence liability, all claims based on no-fault were to be made against a 
fund financed by the pharmaceutical producers. This change was welcomed
6The criminal trial against the manufacturers, Chemie-Grünenthal, lasted 2 '/2 years and was eventually 
suspended, as part o f the settlement, on the ground (StGB. § 153(3) that culpability was small {genug) and 
that continuation was not in the public interest. See JZ  1971, 507.
7Wolter, “Die Reform der Haftung des pharmazeutischen Unternehmers und der Verbrauchersihultz", 
ZRP, (1974) 260; and "Die Haftungsregelung des neuen Arzneimittelgesetzes", DH, (1976) 2001.
"The term used bv A.L.I. Restatement, Second. Torts § 519. The original Restatement spoke o f "ultra- 
hazardous”.
^Germany has so far shunned any “general clause" {Generalklausel) on the lines of socialist legislation. See 
generally Will, Quellen erhöhter Gefahr, (1980).
'“Since 1951 (fonds de garantie). See S. Tunc, “Establishment o f ‘Fonds de Garantie' to Compensate Victims 
o f Motor Vehicle Accidents,” (1953) 2 Am. J .  Comp L., 232.
“ Motorists' Compulsory Insurance I.aw (PH VG), 5 April 1965.
i2E.g. Simitis, Gutachten zum 47, D.J.T., (1968) C82.
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by the industry for lowering their financial exposure by dispensing with 
individual strict liability and by excluding non-pecuniary losses from claims 
against the fund. T h e  fund’s role was here more analogous to workers’ 
compensation as structured in Germany around trade associations. Instead 
o f its marginal function, envisaged by the first draft as a mere guarantor 
o f the fiscal responsibility o f civilly liable individual defendants, the fund 
here assumed the central role o f compensating all claims for development 
risks and other non-negligent injuries.
Yet this plan was no more destined to carry the day than its predecessor. 
In the course o f its parliamentary progress and despite being initially spon­
sored by the government, it was wrecked by an unexpected initiative from 
the insurance industry now fearful o f being squeezed from the market. 
Contrary to earlier intimations, the major insurers suddenly declared them­
selves prepared to underwrite individual producers’ strict liability at reason­
able rates. For reasons that have remained somewhat obscure, the Social 
Democratic government yielded to this overture.13 Thus in 1976,14 Ger­
many once again conservatively deferred to its traditional pattern o f strict 
liability statutes previously mentioned, with their typical, if  controversial,15 
exclusion o f non-pecuniary losses and their limitation o f liability to amounts 
within the capacity o f the insurance industry.16 By adhering to the principle 
o f individual liability, backed by compulsory insurance, its promoters also 
claimed the advantages o f deterrence. On the other hand, by preserving 
the role o f the insurance industry as intermediary, the plan substantially 
increased its overhead cost and was for that reason opposed by the phar­
maceutical industry, which thought it could operate a fund o f its own less 
expensively. While the general consumer public will in the end have to 
shoulder that extra cost, individual claimants would ordinarily be unaf­
fected by the choice between fund and strict liability. Indeed, the latter was 
claimed to be superior on the dubious ground that claims could be ad­
dressed directly to the injurer. By the same token, however, it requires 
precise identification o f the source o f the drug, which experience has shown 
to be sometimes difficult, if not impossible.17
Coverage
T h e scheme, whatever its precise form, was never intended to provide 
insurance against all drug risks; rather, compensation was intended only
,vThe conservative opposition parties continued to espouse the fund solution. For a behind the scenes 
vignette see Der Spiegel, No. 18, (1976) at 86.
MArzneimittelgesetz, 24 August 1976, §§ 84-94.
15A reform proposal emanating f rom the Ministry of Justice in 1967 (Referentenentwurf) proposed deletion 
o f this feature but has not so far been acted upon.
16The maximia for injury or death to any individual claimant are DM 500,000 ($210,000) or an anuity o f 
DM 30,000 ($12,600), for all injuries caused by the same drug DM. 200 mill. ($84 mill.) or anuities of DM 
12 mill. ($5 mill.): § 88.
17In fra, text at footnote 69.
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for personal injury (and death) resulting from defective drugs. T h e statutory 
definition o f the covered risks marks out the respective spheres o f respon­
sibility as between producer and user.
A claim may be made if the injury was caused by a prescription drug 
“whose harmful effects in the course o f its prescribed use objectively ex­
ceeded acceptable limits in the light o f medical scientific knowledge.”18 This 
postulates a hindsight test to cover “development risks”, in order to reach 
the very situation illustrated by the thalidomide disaster. But it also reaches 
exceptional (non-negligent) manufacturing defects, and (expressly) failures 
to warn. T h e consumer forfeits all protection by use not conforming to 
the m anufacturer’s instructions, and is accountable for contributory fault 
in accordance with the customary regime o f apportionment (comparative 
negligence).19
So far as is known, not a single claim has yet been made under the 
new act.
Sweden
Swedish reform  followed close on the heels o f the Germ an.20 A gov­
ernm ent committee appointed in March 1973 to consider the general prob­
lem o f products liability (hence called the Product Liability Committee) 
decided at the start to confine itself to the drug industry. Taking a leaf 
from the contemporary German plan for an industry-financed fund, the 
Committee in 1976 proposed a basically similar scheme for legislation in 
Sweden. However, the one eventually adopted, which came into force in 
July 1978, was a voluntary group insurance set up jointly by the phar­
maceutical manufacturers and importers with the major insurance com­
panies, under the threat o f alternative legislation by the Ministry o f Justice. 
T his informal (or private) method o f “legislation” is occasionally encoun­
tered elsewhere, as illustrated in the United Kingdom by the Motor In­
surance Bureau for uninsured motorist claims.21 In Sweden, however, this
l*Supra, footnote 14, at § 84.
]9Supra, footnote 14, at § 85.
*°Dufwa, “A No-Fault or Strict Liability Scheme in Action — Sweden" (1970, unpub.); Dufwa, "Product 
Liability Legislation. General Problems and Techniques. Thp Swedish Experience", (1980) Tidsknft, Jur. 
For. Finland, pt. 1-2; Dufwa, “Responsibilité du Fait des Produits en Droit Suédois," (1977) 29 Reir Int. Dr. 
Comp., 525.
*'Atiyah, Accidents and the Law, (1970) 274-80.
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procedure seems to have become habituated as a more general device for 
replacing tort liability with group insurance.22
T h e first experiments o f that sort occurred in the fields o f work 
accidents23 and medical mishaps.24 In both instances, the victim’s safety net 
would be social security but any recovery over and above (especially non- 
pecuniary loss) would have to be sought via tort damages (at least in the 
absence o f private insurance). T h e tort system, with its adversary posture, 
long delays and high transaction costs, had aroused public concern espe­
cially in the above-mentioned fields. A more efficient substitute was first- 
party insurance to bridge the gap between social security benefits and full 
compensation, financed in the case o f work injuries by the employers and 
in the case o f patient insurance by the county councils which in Sweden 
are responsible for health care.25 Both schemes are administered by syn­
dicates o f  the largest insurance companies.
T h e advantages o f first-party insurance are o f  course recognized also 
by t’ie promoters o f no-fault automobile plans in the United States and 
Canada.26 But there is this fundamental difference:27 our no-fault plans 
(despite their considerable variation in benefits) purport to cover only basic 
losses which in Sweden are taken care o f by social security; the Swedish 
insurance schemes on the other hand cover the top losses which even in 
no-fault jurisdictions in North America are still left to the tender mercies 
o f the tort system.28
'•"The Swedish preference for “private legislation" is clearly articulated: greater flexibility, ease of changes 
in the light of experience, preference for arbitration, etc. Hellner, “Schweden," Haftungsersetzung durch 
Versicherungschutz, (1980) 24. Quite aside from the below-mentioned plans dealing with accidents, Sweden 
had previously committed itself to a “2-step" system of comprehensive income replacement for disability: 
social security, augmented by nonstatutory industry-wide group insurance financed by employers both for 
white collar and blue collar employees. Only the automobile accident scheme is statutory: Hellner, “The 
Swedish Traffic Damage Act o f 1975," 2 Harmonization o f Insurance Risk, (Antwerp, 1981) 269.
^Introduced in 1974. See Hellner, “Geborgenheitsversicherung," Festschrift Khngmuller, (1974) 159.
24lntroduced in 1975. Cohen and Korper. “T he Swedish No-Fault Patient Compensation Program: Pro­
visions and Preliminary Finds", (1976) Ins. L .J. 70; Oldertz (Skandia Int’l Symposia), Unexpected Complications 
in Medical Care. (1979) at 237. Wevers, "Gutachten zum", (1978) 52 D.J.T., 74-78. The Flnglish analogues 
are more obscure or arcane (e.g. the government was afraid that a legislative scheme for victims of crime 
would imp'icitly acknowledge an obligation to protect citizens against crime).
^Channeling is f urther ensured by (1) compelling deduction o f both types of benefits from tort damages 
and (2) denying reimbursement to either fund from tortfeasors.
'^The prototype was developed by Keeton and O ’Connell, Protection for the Traffic Victim. (1965).
'llSupra, footnote 22, at 37.
**C/. the still-born proposal by Morris and Paul. “T he Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents", (1962) 
110 V. Pa. L. Reii. 913 for an automobile plan that would cover the top rather than the bottom losses in 
view of the well-documented phenomenon that the smaller injuries are typically over-compensated due to 
collateral benefits while the severer injuries are progressively under-compensated. See also Conard, "The 
Economic Treatment o f Automobile Injuries", (1964) 63 Mich. L. Rev. 279 at 291.
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A characteristic o f prevailing Scandinavian practice,29 is that disputes 
are relegated to non-judicial procedures —  in the first instance, to an eight- 
member board (Drug Injury Committee)30 and as a last resort, to arbitra­
tion. Compensation which includes pain and suffering, disfigurement and 
general inconvenience in accordance with prescribed tariffs, is ordinarily 
in the form o f lump sums, but in the case o f longer-lasting and severer 
disability, in the form o f ino°xed periodical payments.51 As under the 
German scheme, there are maxima but more generous ones. Individual 
£ .Yards are limited to SKr 2 mill. (U S. $300,000), total awards for the same 
kind o f drug to 75 mill. ($13 mill.) and total liability for injuries in any one 
year to 150 mill. ($25 mill.)52
Coverage
Unlike the German scheme, the Swedish is not limited to defective drugs 
but proceeds on a wider insurance principle. Covered are all “drug-related 
injuries”, including injuries due to a subsequent change in the composition 
o f a drug or to the action o f third parties, such as a physician’s misdiagnosis 
and consequent prescription o f the wrong drug. Excluded are any mere 
ineffectiveness o f a drug,33 relatively minor disability,34 side effects which, 
given the patient’s health and medical prediction, should reasonably be 
endured,35 and wilful misuse or knowing violation o f drug regulations.36 
No doubt because o f its more generous scope, the number o f applications 
have not been insubstantial, though less than expected, and the largest 
proportion has been denied.37
wBengtsson, “Personal Injury Boards in Sweden", (1970) 18 Am J .  Comp L. 108.
’"There are no legal members as such, and legal representation bv the parties is discouraged by denying 
legal aid.






,7ln the first two years, out o f about 250 claims 50% were denied, 2691 still pending and 24% allowed. ()1 
the 86 unsuccessful claims, 20 were denied for lack of causality, 7 for triviality, and 59 because of "risk- 
evaluation” (§ 5). Dufwa “A No-Fault Scheme", supra, footnote 20.
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Japan
Japanese reform  was propelled as much by public opinion aroused 
over the long delays in the settlement o f the thalidomide58 and SM ON59 
disasters as by a government anxious to avoid in the future the stigma of 
culpability in respect o f its licensing role.40 Thus, promptly after the fourth 
SMON decision in 1978, the government submitted a bill which was even­
tually passed into law in September 1979.41 Its model was neither the G er­
man one o f strict liability nor the Swedish one o f group insurance, but 
rather that o f a legislatively enacted special compensation fund with social 
security overtones. In many respects its prototype was the compensation 
plan for pollution victims set up in 1973 in the wake o f the Minimata, 
Toyama, and sii. lar catastrophes.42
Benefits are prescribed by tariffs on social security lines and cover 
medical expenses, medical allowance, disability pension (two degrees), pen­
sions for bringing-up injured children and death benefits. T h e level of 
benefits is substantially higher than under National Health Insurance, but 
well below tort damages by excluding non-pecuniary loss and limiting com­
pensation for economic loss.45 Entitlement is defined on a no-fault basis 
but victims remain free to pursue their tort remedy; indeed no benefits 
are payable if it appears that someone’s negligence was responsible for the 
injury. Critics on the plaintiffs’ side complain about the prejudicial effect 
o f the latter provision in its tendency to delay compensation or force a 
reluctant victim to engage in tort litigation. They deplore even more the 
refusal to replace negligence with strict liability as a basis for tort recovery.
T h e fund is financed by manufacturers and importers o f drugs ac­
cording to a prescribed formula (having regard to the number o f drugs 
sold, their price and their risk rate) and finally by discretionary government 
subsidies. T h e fund is entitled to reimbursement from anyone culpable o f 
negligence.
’"Litigation between 1962 and 1973 in eight different district courts eventually terminated in a settlement, 
October 1974, in which the state and the manufacturer confessed liability. Adachi “Der • halidomid-Fall: 
Aspekte und Ergebnisse", Arznnmiltelprobleme at 89, 99-100.
,wT he SMON litigation, involving the drug chinoform, was launched in 1971. L^ter split among several 
courts, the Tokyo district court rendered the first decision in 1976. Judge Kabe, after holding the man­
ufacturers and the government liable for negligence, proposed standards for a settlement o f the various 
claims. Nearly 409? o f the plaintiffs accepted a settlement within those standards. l.ater, the nine other 
district courts followed these guidelines.
iu Supra, footnote 5.
* ]Drup Siue-Effect Injury R elief Fund Act, 7 Sept. 1979. Morishima. “On the Bill of Drug Injury Relief Act", 
(1979) 696 /unst 51; lshibashi, “Some Problems o f the Drug Injury Relief Act", (1979) 51 Hontsujtho 63.
I am indebted to Professor Katsumasa Hirabavashi's help with these materials.
42Gresser, Fujikama & Morishima, Environmental L a v  in Japan , (1981) ch.6 [hereinaf ter cited Gresser],
4,Present maxima are Personal Injury Pension o f annually £  1,760,400 ($7,000), Bereaved Family Pension 
Y  1,539,600 ($6,160). For similar standards of benefits under the Pollution Compensation scheme see
Gresser, supra, footnote 42 at 294-95. For comparison see the lump-sum standards set by Judge Kabe in
the Tokyo SMON case: Hanretjiho (1977) No. 838, (the State) 29. No. 846 (manufacturers) 48. The Con­
firmation was published in (1979) 5 Hortisujiho 517. See also translation of judgement and settlement terms 
by the Hiroshima court in (1979) 12 Law o f Japan  99
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JU STIFICA TIO N  FO R SPECIAL COMPENSATION PLANS*
Special or tailored compensation plans which focus on a particular set 
o f accidents rather than on accidents generally are not a new idea. Workers' 
compensation was the first and remains the most prominent experiment 
o f this sort, assuring compensation for work injuries and increasingly for 
industrial diseases. In more recent years a rapidly growing number o f other 
programs have followed that inspiration: compensation plans for auto ac­
cidents,44 aircraft accidents,45 nuclear accidents,46 pollution,47 and black lung 
victims,48 victims o f violent crimes,49 o f medical mishaps,50 o f vaccination,51
*This section draws on a studv by myself and Professor Steven I). Sugarman for the President’s Commission 
for the Study o f Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research on the subject of 
compensation for human medical research subjects (unpub. 1981).
i4E.g. "no-fault" automobile plans in the U.S., Sweden. Israc-r and the recommendation bv the Pearson 
Commission in Britain (1978). In this list one could include also statutes imposing a special strict liabilitv. 
as in Germany and Switzerland. See generally Tunc, "Traffic Accident Compensation Law and Proposals", 
Int’l Encycl. Comp. L. X I ch. 14; and Pour Une Lot Sur Les Accidents de la Circulation (1981).
45The W'arsaw convention for international flights and legislation for domestic flights in many countries.
S i l l ie r ,  “Nuclear Energy”. Int’l Emycl. Comp. L. X I Ch.5, §§ 214-225. Cf. the Price-Anderson Act 1056 in 
the U.S. (infra, footnote 105).
47£.£. the Japanese scheme, supra, footnote 41. See also Soble, “A Proposal tor the Administrative Com­
pensation o f Victims o f Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act”, (1977) 14 Han\ /. Leg. 683. Gresser (supra, 
footnotes 42, at 497-8, 195) suggests several reasons why the problem o f pollution compensation has been 
ignored for so long in the U.S. But note "Superfund” legislation for cleamng-up chemical waste dumps, 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabilitv Act of 1980 (Superfund). P.L. 96- 
510. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 ff.; Note, “Conscripting Industry Support for Environmental Cleanup." (1981) 9 
Ecology L.Q. 524.
4*U.S.: Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 901 ff.. upheld against constitutional attack bv mine operators 
for denial o f “substantive due process": justified as serving to spread costs in a rational manner b\ allocating 
to the operator the actual cost o f its business. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Alining Co.. (1976) 428 U.S. 1 U.K..: 
British National Coal Board Scheme 1974 (Pearson Report I § 790).
49See Stoll, “Compensation in the Context o f Criminal Law," Int'l Enncl. Comp. L. XI ch.8. S§ 49-62; Schafer. 
Restitution to Victim.* of Crime (I960). Atiyah, Accuients, Compensation and the Law  (1970), at 319-26 questions 
at length, the justification for preferential treatment of such victims. But the Pearson Commission consid­
ered it “morally justified as in some measure salving the nation's conscience at its inability to preserve law 
and order" (§ 588). In New Zealand it was absorbed into the general scheme o f Compensation for Personal 
Injury (infra, footnote 90).
M)T he Swedish scheme supra, footnote 24.
5lThe Pearson Report ch. 25 recommended strict liability, following special schemes in France (Law, No. 
75-401 of 26 July 1975: see Pearson Report III §5 429-435). West Germany (Law of Epidemics, No. 53, 22 
July 1961 §§ 51-61 see Pearson Report 111 §5 511-12), Switzerland and Denmark. In Britain the Vaccine 
Damage Payments Act 1979 gave formal authority to the practice since 1948 o f government tax-free grants 
of £ 10,000 in case o f death or serious disablement. Cf. Mc Intosh. “Liability and Compensation Aspects 
o f Immunization Injury: A Call for Reform", (1980) ¡8  Osg. H.L.J. 584. Franklin Sc Mais, “Tort Law and 
Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons From Polio and Flu Episodes". (1977) 65 Calif. L. Rex’. 754 also 
advocates "internalizing" by the government. In the U.S., under existing law, the manufacturers alone 
bear strict liability for defective vaccine (i.e. a vaccine that causes the very disease against which it was 
designed to protect): Gottesdanker v. Cutter Laboratories (I960), 182 Cal. App. (2d) 602 (Salk: implied war­
ranty); Gnnnell v. Charles Pfizer £if Co. (1969), 284 Cal. App. (2d) 424 (Sabin: stric t liability). A compensation 
plan financed by manufacturers is recommended by Ladimer, “Legal and Regulatory Perspectives in Mass 
Immunization Programs," (1976) Ins. L .J. 459.
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o f medical experim ents,52 and even o f sporting activities.53 Compensation 
plans for victims o f pharmaceutical drugs are thus only the latest arrivals 
along a well beaten track.
Compensation plans are typically justified by one or more complaints 
as to why tort law peculiarly fails to cope adequately with the class o f 
accidents in question. T h e literature is rich with the writings o f law re­
formers whose studies o f a particular kind o f accident had convinced them 
that a compensation scheme was needed to cure the shortcomings o f tort 
law. T h e Pearson Commission Report, a latter-day kind o f Doomsday sur­
vey o f the British accident compensation scene, abounds in such recom­
mendations.54
However, the complaints about tort law vary from one such plan to 
another. One claim is that the tort treatment is especially unjust. For ex­
ample, workers’ compensation arose in response to the harsh application 
o f assumption o f risk and other defenses which, at the time, virtually pre­
cluded successful tort recovery.
A second claim is that the tort system o f dealing with the problem is 
not only administratively too costly but is also beset with fraud. This position 
has been emphasized in the debate over auto no-fault.
A third claim is that the tort solution requires unusually difficult de­
terminations o f causation (as in pollution and drug cases) or o f negligence 
(as in auto accidents).
A fourth and related claim is that tort law in action takes on a lottery 
aspect as similarly situated victims are treated unequally by juries —  a claim 
often made about auto and medical accident victims.
A fifth justification rests on the claim that the compensation plan will 
better deter socially undesirable conduct; and a sixth and related claim is 
that the compensation plan will better promote the efficient allocation o f 
- resources. With a rise in popularity o f law-and-economics, these latter jus­
tifications are heard with increasing frequency.
“ T he Pearson Report §§ 1340-41 recommended strict liability. So did Havighurst, “Mechanisms for Com­
pensating Persons Injured in Human Experimentation,”//£W Secretary's Task Force on the Compensation of 
Injured Research Subjects, (1977) Appendix A 81. embracing Calabresi's theory of internalizing the risk. The 
Report bv the present writer and Professor Sugarman (supra, p. *) to the "successor” committee was more 
skeptical. On an earlier occasion (ibid, at 105) Havighurst advocated that subjects be paid on a scale 
corresponding to the gravity of the risk. But unless first-party insurance against medical costs and income 
maintenance is available (clearlv, at least the latter is not) or it be assumed (against all evidence) that only 
deliberate risk-takers are involved, it would seem better to use the extra cost for compensation purposes.
"Sporting In/urs Insurance Act, 1978 (N.S.W.).
''Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Persoruil Injury, Report (3 vols. 1978). See generally, 
Heming. "T he Pearson Report: It’s Strategy". (1979) 42 Mod L. Rev. 249; Marsh. "T h e Pearson Report".
(1979) 95 Law (¿. Rev. 513, Allen, Bourn & Holvoak, supra, footnote 1.
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A seventh argument focuses on the insolvent wrongdoer: for example 
in plans for victims o f violent crimes.
An eighth justification is the desirability o f compensation itself. It is 
sometimes linked with the claim that tort damages overcompensate, for 
example in auto nuisance claims and, for some critics, in all awards for 
pain and suffering. Usually, however, the driving concern is the failure o f 
tort law to compensate victims adequately —  in particular, its failure to 
compensate some victims at all. This justification —  but only this one —  is 
nearly universally invokes by compensation supporters.
In considering the desirability o f a compensation scheme for a new 
area, it may advance analysis to consider which o f these justifications is 
applicable.
Coverage
Many o f the complaints against the tort system are applicable to the 
drug problem. As to the first, it is probably the case that the theoretical 
conditions o f recovery are no more formidable for drug victims than for 
those injured by other injurious products.55 In most countries, the plaintiff 
would be required to establish negligence, but the trend is to relax that 
standard, whether by shifting the burden o f proof to the defendant (as in 
Germany56) or by imposing outright strict liability (as in the United States ’7) 
for all “defective” products. This preference over the generality o f other 
accident victims is justified principally on the grounds that the injured 
consumer is at a disadvantage in access to evidence ar.d information com ­
pared to the manufacturer, and that such liability ten* Is to “internalize” the 
accident cost and thereby promote a more ef ficient allocation o f economic 
resources through specific or “general” deterrence.58 However, in the three
i!,Indeed in the U.S. the drug victim has been traditionally favored. I'he "privity requirement" in actions 
for negligence was relaxed long before MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916). 217 N.Y. 382 by bringing 
drugs under the “inherently dangerous" exception: Thomas v. Winchester (1852). 6 N.Y. 397. Later, drugs 
joined food and drink as candidates for strict liability before its extension to products generally: e.g. 
Gotlsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, supra, footnote 51.
’•’Federal Supreme Court (BGH, 26 Nov. 1968) BGHZ 51, 91. See Lorenz, “Zur Entscheidung des Bun- 
desgerichtshofs im HchnerpestfaH”, (1970) 34 RabelsZ. 14; generally, Kotz, Deliktsrecht (1976). at 187-207. 
A similar tendency has been observed in the Japanese drug and pollution cases of the '70s. Ihe first case 
to invoke an "inference" o f fault ("as long as an adequate rebuttal is not forthcoming") against a drug 
manufacturer was the "Hokuziko" SMON case: Arzneimittelprobleme at 83, 84.
37Merrill, “Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries", (1973) 59 Va. L. Rev. 1. "Im pure" drugs, like 
the uncooked batch of vaccine in Gotlsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, supra, footnote 51 entail strict liability. 
But dangerous “pure" drugs raise the question of design defects, liability for which is as a rule tested by 
a negligence standard. Infra, foonote 60 on the question of hindsight vs. “state of the art." On products 
liability generally see Restatement, Torts, Second §§ 402A; Noel and Phillips. Products Liability (2nd ed. 
1980); R. Epstein, Modem Products Liability Law (1980).
a Owen, “Rethinking the Policies o f Strict Products Liability", (1980) 33 \and. L. Rev. 681; Cowan, “Policy 
Bases of Products Liability", (1965) 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1077; Symposium "Products Liability: Economic Analysis 
and the Law”, (1970) 38 Chi. L. Rev. I. “General deterrance," a notion explored by Calabresi, The Cost o/ 
Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970) is pursued in greated detail, infra, text, footnote 80.
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countries that have so far adopted special plans for drug victims, the prior 
law was based on negligence so that the reform could be regarded as a first 
and most urgent step towards no-fault liability for all products.59 For that 
matter, in countries which have already adopted strict liability for all de­
fective products (like most United States jurisdictions) or are preparing to 
do so (like Great Britain), the need o f a special regime for drugs is less 
keenly felt. Nowhere does the interposition o f a licensing authority appear 
to deHect the drug developer’s responsibility.60
Perhaps the most important practical limitation on liability for negli­
gence is that it does not cover “development risks", i.e., risks which the 
m anufacturer neither knew or should have known at the time o f marketing 
in the light o f existing scientific knowledge. Even under strict liability there 
is strong support for excluding such risks which, it is feared, would expose 
industry to an impossible burden that is practically uninsurable, would 
uneconomically tie up enormous reserves and would be difficult, if  not 
improper, to pass on to the consumer public.61 Others, however, argue no 
less persuasively that reform is needed precisely to provide this extra pro­
tection both as an incentive to even greater investment in prophylactic 
research and because the victims o f development risks are especially de­
serving in that they are, so to speak, sacrificed for the sake o f medical 
progress much like experimental research volunteers.62 Here, compromise 
between these opposing views can be found in extending coverage to de­
velopment risks but subject to financial limits within the capacity o f the 
affected industry and its insurers. This solution is embodied in the EEC
wWhile the manufacturers o f thalidomide and SMON were actually found culpable, the burden of proving 
negligence contributed greatly to the delay in reaching a decision. Thus what aroused public anger was 
the inefficiency of the tort system more than its doctrinal inadequacy.
w'The Pearson Report I § 1260 specifically opposed any exception from strict liability for '‘officially certified" 
drugs. So did the Ontario Law Commission [Report on Products Liability 90 (1979)] and the English Law 
Commission (Report Xo. 82  para. 612 (1977)]. For a contrary argument see Page Keeton, “Products Liability 
— Drugs and Cosmetics”, (1972) 25 Vand. L. R ei' 131. T he Uniform Product Liability Act § 108 would create 
a resumption that a product conforming to legislative or administrative regulatory safety standards relating 
to design and performance was not “defective.” Several states have legislated a "state of the art defense", 
making conformity with governmental standards either a complete defense (Ariz., Ind., Wash.) or a re­
buttable presumption (Utah. Colo.). See Note, “State of the Art Defense in Products Liability: ‘Unreasonably 
Dangerous' to the Injured Consumer”, (1980) 18 Duquesne L. Rev. 915.
6lThus the Uniform Product Liability Act S 106(B) postulates “the state of scientific and technological knowl­
edge at the time of manufacture". According to the accompanying Analvsis, "this approach has been 
followed by the common law courts throughout the United Stales.” See e.g. brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
Corp. (1981), 642 F. 2d 652 at 657 (1st Cir.). But see Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., (1978) 20 Cal. (3d) 413, 
which seems to espouse a hindsight test.
wSee e.g. Pearson Report 1 §§ 1258-59; English Law Commission, supra, footnote 60 at para. 105. Among 
American advocates: James, "Products Liability", (1955) 34 Texas L. Rev. 192 at 215; Kheingold, "Products 
Liability — The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability", (1964) 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 947 at 1001; Wade, “On 
the Nature of Strict Liability for Defective Products", (1973) 44 Miss. L. J .  825 at 835-6; Pratt and Parnon, 
“Diagnosis o f a Legal Headache: Liability for L'nforseeable Defects in Drugs", (1979) 53 St. J .  L. Rev. 517.
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draft directive on products liability63 and, to some extent,64 in the three 
drug plans here being considered.65
Plaintiffs in ordinary civil litigation often face additional special prob­
lems in drug cases. Most prominent perhaps is the difficulty o f proving 
causation. However, experience at least in the United States indicates a 
general acceptance o f statistical proof and, in practice, a less than rigorious 
standard o f persuasion.66 T h e first German draft for a drug compensation 
scheme expressly postulated an even lesser standard,67 but this concession 
was later dropped. In the result, all three schemes condition compensation 
on the regular standard o f proof o f drug-related injury, though, as already 
observed, the extent o f coverage varies from one scheme to another. At 
one end is the cautious German definition which excludes foreseeable risks 
that must be tolerated in the light o f medical knowledge; at the other end 
is the Swedish scheme which includes even misapplication by medical per­
sonnel.
Another causation problem illustrates the difference between the tort 
and the fund models. The received tort theory, whether based on negli­
gence or strict liability (like the German drug act), requires identification 
o f the source o f the particular drug that caused the injury. W hether cases 
o f multiple pollution68 or generic drugs69 justify a lesser standard, at least 
once the defendant’s culpability has been established, remains highly con­
MJolowicz, "Product-Liability — the EEC and the House of Lords”, (1980) Camb. L.J. 263. Bv contrast the 
Strassbourg Convention (1975), on which the draft Directive is based, omitted maxima: see Fleming, “Draft 
Convention on Products Liability (Council o f Europe)”, (1975) 23 Am. J .  Comp. L. 729; Lorenz. “Some 
Comparative Aspects o f the European Unification o f the I.aw o f Products Liability", (1975) 60 Cornell L.Q. 
1005; Harland, “Products Liability and International Trade Law”, (1977) 8 Syd. L. Hev. 357.
MThe German and Japanese schemes contain maxima, the Swedish is limited to the slice above social 
security benefits.
65The Pearson Report I § 1264 opposed the idea on administrative grounds.
toReyes v. Wyeth Laboratories (1974), 498 F. 2d 1264 (5th cir.).
67/.r, that causal responsibility was “credible" (glaubhaft) rather than probable. Cf. the presumptions under 
the Black Lung Act § 413(b), unsuccessfully impugned in Users v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. (1976), 428 
U.S. 1, supra, footnote 48.
•’•'Japanese courts pioneered highlv innovative approaches in the major pollution cases: see Gresser. supra. 
footnote 42, ch. 3 at 128-30.
wIn the celebrated case o f Stndell v. Abbott Laboratories. (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 588. the California court applied 
the novel solution o f market-share liability against all manufacturers o f DES, a generic drug. Whether 
other courts are prepared to follow this lead remains to be seen. See e.g. Fischer, "Products Liability — 
An Analysis o f Maiket Share Liability”. (1981) 34 Vanii. L Rei’. 1623. The German Civil Code. BGB § 840
I 2 provides for a shifting o f the burden of proof to "participants” (Beteiligte) who, traditionally, had to 1h‘ 
related to the accident by a “unity o f place, time and fact" (Altemativtaterschaft). But lately the term has 
been interpreted more liberally: see Deutsch, Haftungsrecht (1976) 349-357. Japanese courts invoked a 
corresponding provision (Civ. Code § 719) against the three manufacturers o f SMON and the government.
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troversial. In contrast, the fund model would avoid this difficulty, since it 
is sufficient that the drug itself, regardless o f its source, be identified.70
Deterrence
One o f the most familiar claims for the tort system is that it deters 
accidents by giving the actor a choice between avoiding liability by exercising 
the requisite amount o f care or exposing himself to the risk o f liability by 
saving the expense o f precautionary measures. Indeed, some enthusiasts 
argue that this constellation will result in the most efficient allocation o f 
resources inasmuch as the actor, motivated by self-interest, will be likely to 
choose the — to him — less costly alternative, at any rate in the best o f all 
possible worlds, which would afford him full information to guide his 
decision. Indeed, the market theorists go further, invoking the authority 
o f Judge Learned Hand to suggest that only cost-unjustified risks be treated 
as negligent (unreasonable).71
We may accept that the prospect o f tort liability does enter into the 
calculations o f manufacturers and other business enterprises more, per­
haps, than o f automobile drivers and the like, whose behavior is less planned 
and less sensitive to such a stimulus. Would a move from negligence to 
strict liability weaken this incentive o f accident prevention? Though some 
critics have advanced this theory, arguing that rational people will invest 
less if they have no chance o f  avoiding the loss, experience and common 
sense suggests to the contrary that strict liability promotes the highest stand­
ard o f care since they can no longer bank on benefiting from the forensic 
vagaries o f fault finding.
Strict liability, like negligence, is geared to the individual producer. A 
compensation fund, on the other hand, represents collectivization o f the 
cost among a larger pool, for example of all drug producers. It is therefore 
arguable that this may result in some individual or even collective lessening 
of inventives. Evidently, however, such a prospect has not deterred the 
widespread socialization o f accident losses through liability and social in­
surance (often without subrogation rights72), let alone comprehensive ac­
70The problem of identification does not appear to have influenced the structure of the three existing drug 
schemes: see e.g. Wolter, “Hafiungsregelung", supra, footnote 7, at footnote 36. The advantage of a fund 
is illuminated bv the interesting French case of the two hunters who both negligently fired in the plaintiff's 
direction but it could not be determined who shot and wounded the plaintiff. While excusing the hunters 
individually', the Grenoble court nonetheless imposed liability on their common insurer: 1963 Rev. trim, 
dr. civ. 555 (note by Tunc). American and Canadian courts have held such hunters liable by imposing on 
them the burden o f incrimination: Summers v. Tice (1948), 199 P. 2d 1 (Cal.); Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 
830.
7lPosner, “A Theory o f Negligence", (1972) 1J .  Leg. Stud. 29. The reference is to jud ge L. Hand’s celebrated, 
if incautious, formula of negligence as meaning that the probability and gravity o f the risk outweighs the 
burden of avoid it = B < P L : U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co. ( 1947), 159 F. 2d 169 (2d Cir.). I he manufacturer 
would not in any event invest additional resources in accident prevention (in the absence of other coercion) 
even if the law held him negligent for failing to adopt cost-unjustified precautions). Cf. Coase, “T he Problem 
of Social Cost", (1960) 3 J.L . &  Econ. 1.
72As in Great Britain and Sweden: see Fleming, “Collateral Sources," Int'l Encyl. Comp. L. XI ch .l 1. §§ 63- 
73; Hellner, "Damages for Personal Injury and the Victim's Private Insurance”, (1970) 18 Am. /. Comp. L. 
126.
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cident schemes like that in New Zealand73 and the developing insurance 
scenario in Sweden.74 Special funds limited to a particular industrial group, 
like the drug industry, do offer a plausible incentive to minimizing collective 
costs. In any event, there may be other safeguards. In the case o f the drug 
industry, which certainly has its share o f “bad eggs”,75 licensing authority 
such as the FDA in the United States, provides a screen between producer 
and consumer which might serve as effective a substitute as individualized 
loss bearing. Besides adverse publicity, which on occasion has proven a 
formidable ally o f consumer protection,76 there is finally a residual sanction 
in criminal proceedings which has also been shown in the past to be more 
than an empty threat.77
Over-deterrence can be as serious a problem as under-deterrence. A 
prominent motive o f the pharmaceutical industry in supporting special 
plans was to secure dollar limitations on its potential liability as a trade-off 
for no-fault compensation. T h e thalidomide affair itself and drug litigation 
since has given cause for genuine alarm that the cost o f adverse judgments 
based on unrestricted tort damages could overwhelm the industry.78 or at 
least either discourage the development o f new and potentially highly ben­
eficial drugs or lead to over-investment in precautions. T h e need for in­
dustry protection obviously grows with increasing exposure to compensation 
claims as a result o f progressively raising the standard o f legal liability. This 
accounts for the limits on products liability proposed in the draft EEC 
directive79 as a concomitant to the move from negligence to strict liability. 
Compensation plans limited to drug injuries can similarly provide needed 
protection for the industry no less than for its victims.
Related to deterrence is the theory o f internalization.
Internalizing Costs
Lawyer-economists have argued that all costs or to be debited to 
the activity that causes them so that they are reflected in the price o f the
75/n/ra, footnote 87.
74See Hellner. "Haftungsersetzung," supra, footnote 22.
75Probably the worst case was mounted against Richardson-Merrell. Inc. in the MER/29 litigation which 
resulted in repeated awards of punitive damages against that firm: see Toole v. Richardson-Merrell (1967), 
251 Cal. App. 2d 689; Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell (1967), 378 F. 2d 832 (2d Cir); Rheingold. “The MF.R/
29 Story — An Instance o f Successful Mass Disaster Litigation", (1968) 56 Calif. L. Rev. 116 at 117-21.
76C)n the other hand, tort litigation tends to locus public attention on harmful products: see Linden. "Tort 
Law as Ombudsman”, (1973) 51 Can. b . Rev. 155.
11 E.g. Richardson-Merrell, and several o f its employees implicated in the MER/29 scandal were convicted: 
Rheingold, supra footnote 75 at 124. Also, the German prtneedings against Chemie-Grunenthal in Aachen 
were criminal.
7HClaims in the current DES litigation are believed to exceed $6 bill.
7,)Supra, footnote 63.
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resulting product or activity.80 T h e cost o f  accidents, in short, is properly 
an item o f the overhead costs o f a particular enterprise. In this way activities 
with higher accident rates will have lesser attraction in the marketplace and 
will thus be carried out to a more socially desirable extent. By contrast, it 
is claimed that if activities do not bear their accident costs they are in effect 
subsidized and will thus be over-produced. This creates both an inefficient 
allocation o f resources and excess accidents to boot. In sum, the market 
mechanism can be enlisted in the pursuit o f “general” deterrence o f acci­
dents.
Although it has become fashionable to argue that tort law should — 
and some have contended that it actually does — serve to internalize costs, 
there are many problems with this line o f analysis. First, negligence law 
does not in fact attempt to assign all accident costs to activities that cause 
them. Rather, it purports to assign only the cost o f accidents that reasonably 
should have been avoided. T o  some, this is an indictment o f negligence. 
T o  other it reveals a fundamental ambiguity about the internalization ar­
gument. What is the cost o f  what?
In many situations policymakers have acted as if there were no problem 
in attributing particular types o f accidents to a specific activity. For example, 
work injuries are by general consensus regarded as part o f the cost o f  
industrial operations: “the product should bear the blood o f the worker.” 
But on closer examination, the problem can become very thorny indeed. 
Is an accident caused by failure o f an industrial tool to be internalized by 
the maker or by the user o f the tool? I f  motfier mink eat their young when 
frightened by sonic booms, is this the cost o f  national defense or mink 
farming?
I f  internalization has the function o f placing the cost on the best loss 
avoider and thus serve the cause o f “general deterrence”, it is plausible 
enough to allocate the cost o f avoidable product injuries to producers who 
fail to invest to a socially desirable extent in accident prevention. But ap­
plying it to “development risks”, which are unavoidable and preventable 
only by incurring socially undesirable costs (e.g. even longer periods o f 
testing with resulting delay in marketing beneficial drugs), would result in 
a misallocation o f economic resources. At best, “general deterrence” can 
then no longer point to the production o f drugs rather than to their con­
sumption as the activity to which the cost o f such accidents should be inter­
nalized. In sum, compensation for development risks may be thought 
desirable for the sake o f compensating the injured out o f a deeper pocket, 
spreading the cost among a larger risk pool, etc., but it cannot be justified 
on grounds o f  efficient resource allocation.
“’Especially Calabresi and his epigones. Calabresi, supra, footnote 58. Applied to the drug problem by 
Merrill, supra, at 87 ff.
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A second reservation about the theory o f internalization is that, given 
all the market imperfections otherwise existing in a modern complex econ­
omy, even if the tort system did achieve acceptable cost-attribution, there 
is no guarantee that it will have moved our economy closer to an efficient 
level o f various accident-producing activities. For example, if a monopolist 
producer o f a product (and this is especially relevant to drug manufacturers 
who usually enjoy a patent monopoly) otherwise underproduces a product 
as economic theory suggests then the failure  to impose accident costs on 
that monopolist could be just the right subsidy needed to boost production 
to the socially desired level.
More important yet is that, in the real world, it is frequently impossible 
to internalize accident costs to the specific offending product or activity. 
For example, not only would a drug that eventually reveals itself as dan­
gerous, in all likelihood be totally withdrawn from the market, but the cost 
o f compensation will in any event probably be spread among all or most 
other products o f the particular manufacturer, with the result that the 
consumers o f the safe drugs will in effect be bearing the accident costs o f 
the dangerous drug. In a theoretical free market, this “externalizing” o f 
the cost might be blocked; but often —  and prescription drugs are a good 
example —  such a hypothesis is wholly unrealistic.81
Government Liability
T h e policy o f deterrence has been invoked not only against the phar­
maceutical industry but also against the government. Government has long 
played a critical role in the marketing o f drugs through its licensing func­
tion. Increasing the pressure for maximum regulatory caution, it is argued, 
can be achieved by exposing the government to shared liability for its 
failures.82 But others would question whether an appreciably larger margin 
o f safety can be achieved in this manner, having regard to the fact that we 
are here concerned principally with so-called development risks (i.e., un­
knowable risks) and to the controlling agency’s dilemma o f balancing the 
expected benefit o f a new drug against the risk o f harmful side effects.
An alternative argument for state participation in the cost o f compen­
sation is the public benefit derived from drug use and development. I his 
is most obvious in the case o f vaccines which inure not only to the benefit 
o f the individual patient, but to the public in general by preventing the 
spread of disease.8* Hence the proliferation o f special compensation schemes
8lTeff, "Products Liability in the Pharmaceutical Industry," (1974) 20 McG. L . J .  102.
“ Merrill, supra, foonote 57, at 68-87.
MLaw-and-economic buf fs would argue that rather than externalize the cost of free-loaders, that cosi should 
be internalized by the general public: see Merrill supra, footnote 57 at 99-102.
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financed by the public purse84 for victims o f publicly-sponsored vaccination 
programs. T h e public interest is also engaged in pharmaceutical and med­
ical progress in general,85 sufficiently it is argued, to warrant passing on at 
least part o f  the cost o f compensation to public funds.86 This would, in 
addition, somewhat relieve the financial burden o f the smaller producers 
who are supposedly unable to spread the compensation cost among a wide 
range o f products and their consumers.
In the past, governments have not been anxious to assume such a 
responsibility aside from the special case o f vaccination. Governments in 
several countries did contribute to the thalidomide settlements, in some 
cases voluntarily (West Germany, Sweden), in others forced by legal process 
(Japan). But the special compensation plans, actual or proposed, do not 
(with the exception o f Japan) envisage any public financial participation.
Transaction Costs
T he most serious criticism that can be levied aggainst the tort system 
is its inordinate expense. Two recent American studies o f different areas 
o f tort liability tell the story. One dealing with automobile accidents con­
cluded that it costs $1.07 in total system expenses to deliver $1.00 in net 
benefits to victims —  plaintiffs’ legal expenses being 23%  and insurers’ 
claim expenses (attorneys’ fees, etc.) 25% o f total operating expenses.87 So 
also the Inter-Agency Task Force on Products Liability88 estimated 40% 
for underwriting expense and profit and an additional 20%  for loss ad­
justment expenses, leaving 40tf o f the premium dollar for the victim and 
his attorney. T h e combined legal expenses for plaintiff and defendant, as 
well as the underwriting expense and profit, each exceeded the claimant’s 
compensation.89
These very high transaction costs o f the tort system compare most 
unfavorably with the cost o f  compensation plans. In New Zealand, which 
abolished the tort system for personal injury in 1974 in favor o f an accident
MSupra. footnote 51. In the U.S. the responsibility surfaced in the Swine Flu Affair, infra, footnote 94. In 
Gottsdankrr, supra, footnote 51, government pressure to speed up the production of Salk vaccine contributed 
to the marketing o f a live batch.
8iAs evidenced, e.g. in the U.S., by the large budgetary support o f the National Institute of Health (NIH).
“ Wolter, “Reform," supra, footnote 7 at 266 argues for no more than half.
"’ Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Crash Losses and their Compensation in the United States, (1971)
47-52.
“ Department o f Commerce, Final Report (1976) V:23-25.
"^The somewhat letter statistics from the English scene cited by the Pearson Report I, § 261, viz. no more
than 4 5 operating costs, are probably attributable to several factors among which a distinctly lower level
of legal fees is onlv one. Others are the lesser incidence of litigation encouraged bv the abolition of juries,
virtual tariffs for damages and more willingness on both sides to compromise.
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compensation scheme,90 the cost o f handling claims amounted to only 8% ;91 
a similar experience is claimed for the Ontario workers’ compensation 
scheme.92 In New Zealand the savings from lower transaction costs accounts 
more than marginal limitations on non-pecuniary loss for the ability to 
provide compensation for all accident victims for the same price ticket.93
T h e high transaction costs o f  the tort system are inherent in the system 
itself. Primary is the adversary relationship between claimant and the com­
pensation source. Liability to compensate is dependent on issues o f caus­
ation and fault, which require investigation and are frequently contested. 
T h e assessment o f damages, tailored to each case, invites additional con­
troversy. In sum, the system is geared to individualized processing and 
does not favor economies o f scale.
Moreover, these costs are incurred in the processing o f all claims, not 
only those that are eventually successful. T h e reluctance o f the drug com­
panies and their insurers to participate in the 1976 swine Hu program in 
the United States stemmed less from their fear o f successful claims than 
from their concern over the cost o f handling claims, spurious as well as 
meritorious. In the upshot, the government had to agree that, rather than 
indemnify the manufacturers (for successful claims), it would handle (de­
fend) all claims directly with a mere right o f reimbursement from negligent 
m anufacturers.94
In the drug field, the defens,e costs under the tort system are unusually 
high. Even where, as in the United States, the basis is strict liability rather 
than negligence, the principal issue remains the highly controverted ques­
tion whether the product was unnecessarily dangerous, i.e., was suffering 
from an actionable “design defect”. This depends, more often than not, 
on striking a cost-benefit balance which, in the opinion o f many observers,95 
patently overtaxes the judicial system, especially juries. At all events, it 
causes mammoth trials and, since an adverse judgment condemns a whole 
product line, manufacturers have every incentive to invest the maximum
90Accident Compensation Act. 1972. See Palmer. Compensation for Incapacity (1979); Ison. Accident Compensation
(1980); Blair, Accident Compensation in New Zealand (1978).
91 Ison, supra, footnote 90. at 122.
94 Report o f the Royal Commission o f Inquiry, Compensation oj Personal In/un in New Zealand (1968) 213. 
In contrast, American workers' compensation is disastrously inefficient, largely because ot its litigious 
aspects. The Interdepartmental Policy Group reported that only 52c in the premium dollar reached the 
victim; Workers' Compensation: Is There a Better Way? (1977), 15.
9,The average levy for employers is now only 1.07*^ of wages, which is of the average premium rate 
paid by employers in New South Wales (Australia) for worker's compensation and common law liability
**42 U.S.C.A. § 2476(j)(i). See Ducharme v. Merrill-National Laboratories (1978), 574 F. 2d, 1307 at 1311 (5th 
cir.); Neustadt and Feinberg, The Swine Flu Affair (1978) 52-53. For a representative, recent claim under 
the program see Overton v. U.S. (1980), 619 F. 2d 1299.
*JSee especially Henderson, "Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: T he Limits of 
Adjudication", (1973) 73 Col. L. Rev. 1531.
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in legal defense. T h e thalidomide,96 SM ON97 and current DES98 litigations 
bear ample witness to this diversion o f resources from victims to “trans­
actors”.
Taking drug injuries out o f the courts therefore looks especially pro­
pitious. T h e German model o f individual liability is clearly the more ex­
pensive, since it involves participation o f private liability insurers besides 
retaining the adversary posture o f third-party claims, always prone to pro­
duce conflict and extra cost. By comparison, the fund model adopted in 
Sweden and Japan, and originally proposed in Germany, has greater at­
traction, though this might have to be balanced against competing consid­
erations, such as the internalization theory previously canvassed.
Horizontal Equity
Another serious flaw o f the negligence system is that it discriminates 
between different accident victims not according to their own deserts, but 
according to the culpability o f the defendant: a claimant’s success is de­
pendent on his ability to pin responsibility for his injury on an identifiable 
agent whose fault he can prove. Put differently, negligence deems as de­
serving only those who can trace their harm to someone’s wrongdoing. T o  
critics, this causes unequal treatment in several ways: between victims o f 
the same kind o f injury, one o f  whom can but another cannot point to a 
responsible cause, e.g., one who breaks his leg in a car accident and another 
who slips in the bathtub;99 between one who does and one who does not 
succeed in proving fault in a defendant —  a distinction exacerbated by the 
vagaries o f jury trial long after the accident in question and by the fine line 
that often divides minimally acceptable and culpable conduct; between 
those with especially effective lawyers and those without and between those 
who are personally attractive victims and those who are not — both o f 
which are thought by critics to influence juries unduly. Not least o f all is 
the fortuitous exclusion o f victims unable to collect from  responsible de­
fendants who turn out to be judgm ent proof, i.e., lacking liability insurance 
or other financial resour. es.
Even among those fortunate enough to obtain some damages, studies 
show a capricious relation between the total amount o f compensation re­
covered from all sources and the gravity o f the injury.100 Although slight
**Supra, footnote 1.
97Supra, footnote 39.
'“ After several years o f litigation over procedural issues, principally the issue o f identification, only two or 
three cases out of hundreds have so far been tried on the merits. T he Swdell decision supra, footnote 69, 
itself encourages vast legal expenditure in cross-claims over the issue oP'market shares'.
"H ence widely known as the “bathtub argument." Home accidents account for 50% of all injuries, industrial 
accidents for 12%, road for 10%, recreational and school for 8% each: Ries. “Episodes of Persons Injured: 
United Stattes, 1975,” DHEW Pub. 78-1250, cited by Bernzweig, B\ Accident Not Design (1980) 15. Likewise 
the Pearson Commission (Report 11 I. 2 & 4) attributed 10S? to road accidents, 25% to work and the 
remainder elsewhere (“bathtubs").
IU0Supra, footnote 28.
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injuries tend to be over-compensated (because o f rr.edical insurance and 
other sources o f compensation which do not set o ff each other or reduce 
tort damages and because o f the nuisance value o f small claims), yet the 
graver the injury the smaller the share o f compensation. Among the reasons 
for this parlous state o f affairs are the low liability insurance coverages held 
by many motorists and the gaps in tort recovery. With much justification, 
the process has been called a “forensic lottery”101 in which a small minority 
obtain a pot o f gold but the majority go empty-handed or obtain only 
tokens o f solace.
By contrast, compensation plans avoid most, if not all, the preceding 
inequities by focusing not on the in jurer’s misconduct but on the victim’s 
injury, by eliminating as many points o f controversy as possible, and by 
assuring financial responsibility. Such preferential treatment in turn raises 
another question o f horizontal equity: Why are they regarded as more 
deserving than others whose condition is in varying degree rather similar?
In the case o f drugs, there are different plans o f increasing scope: 
plans for experimental research volunteers, for vaccine victims, for all drug 
victims however variously defined, and for victims o f all dangerous prod­
ucts, including drugs.102 Preference for the first two classes is commonly 
justified by a special public responsibility. Research volunteers incur risk 
for the sake o f scientific progress, and public immunization confers a benefit 
not only on the individual patient but on the public at large by reducing 
the spread o f disease.103 These subjects are therefore widely deemed de­
serving o f public solicitude at the cost o f those who benefit from their 
sacrifice. Are they not, in a sense, doing a job for the public welfare so as 
to become entitled to much the same benefits as members o f the armed 
services? Yet there are also analogies pointing the other way. Not all victims 
o f programs carried on under government sponsorship for the benefit o f 
the general public fare so well. Indeed, governments have in the past 
notoriously resisted even ordinary tort liability,10’ and not infrequently seek 
to encourage publicly beneficial enterprises like nuclear power plants by 
reducing the protection o f the public and so granting a subsidy at the cost 
o f potential victims.105 Why then should research volunteers and partici­
101 Ison, The Forensic Lottery (1967).
"»Supra, at 17-18. 
m Supra, footnote 83.
"“Immunities still Remain: e.g.. under the Federal Tort Claims Act, ‘28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) for any “disi retionarv 
function or duty.” The FDA’s licensing functions have been consistently held exempt as lx*ing "discre­
tionary": Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products (1979), 610 F. 2d 558 (8th Cir.). In Germany, state liabilitv 
is in any event subsidiary (b c.B  § 839). Only in japan has the slate been held liable in the drug cases.
,0’Thus a constitutional attack on the dollar limitation ($560 mill.) on compensation under the Price- 
Anderson Act was defeated on the ground that the Act bore a rational relation to Congress' concern to 
stimulate private industry development in nuclear energy. This provided an answer to the double attack 
based on due process and equal protection. Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Croup. Inc. 
(1978). 438 U.S. 59. See Green, “Nuclear Power: Risk Liability and Indemnity", (1980) 71 M.L.L.R. 479.
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pants in publicly sponsored immunization programs have a better daim to 
compensation than victims o f military je t  sonic booms106 or victims o f a 
nuclear accident?107 One probate answer is that is for the sake o f encour­
aging participation; it is, if not a bribe, at least the reward for making a 
desired choice in a free society which prefers incentive to compulsion.108
In the case o f ordinary drugs, the argument for preference is even 
more tenuous. Admittedly, we have seen109 a case can be made for gov­
ernment sharing financial responsibility with pharmaceutical producers for 
the cost o f drug injuries because o f the public involvement in the marketing 
and development o f drugs. But this assumption does not address the ar­
gument o f inequity any more than making a distinction between victims o f 
negligence and victims o f innocent causes. In what way, one might ask, 
were the thalidomide children more deserving o f public generosity in Brit­
ain than the 1,000 other handicapped children born every week or the 
100,000 severely handicapped children under sixteen who must be content 
with the benefits o f the general social security program ?110 For that matter, 
how are we to justify the disparity between the British government’s grants 
since 1948 o f £10,000  to serious vaccine victims111 and the £54,000 that 
were eventually awarded to each o f the thalidomide children?112 And on 
what basis are we to prefer the credentials o f cancer victims from drugs to 
those from leaking x-ray equipment or, for that matter, from microwave 
ovens? At any rate, the contemporary debate in Europe over adopting strict 
products liability has turned its back on any distinction between different 
classes o f products because the need for protection seems the same for all.
Special compensation plans, then, suggest a potentially serious problem 
o f injustice. I f  the current treatment o f a given class o f victims is altered 
so that it better conforms to that afforded some other similarly situated 
victims, the change will at the same time place the altered class out of 
harmony with yet another class o f similar victims.
""•Such claims have been consistently rejected either on the ground that the activity is discretionary (Abraham 
v. U.S.. 465 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1972) or that the FTCA does not cover strict liability (I.and  i>. Seims, 406 
U.S. 797 (1972). On the other hand, claims lor compensation up to $25,000 can be made by civilians against 
the military under the 10 U.S.C.A. § 2731.
"'"In the U.S. the Pnte-Anderson Act ol 1957 set a dollar limit on the total liabiliiv for an accident but left 
the standard o f liability (negligence or strict) to the varying perceptions of the individual States. Only 
belatedly did an amendment in 1966 introduce across-the-board no-fault liability for “extraordinary nuclear 
occurrences," for which however not even the Three Mile Island disaster qualified.
"'"This policy is well illustrated by our treatment of rescuers. While we are reluctant to compel rescue, we 
encourage it by “Good Samaritan" laws (which exempt doctors from liability for negligence) and other
means. A plea for compensation o f rescurers is made by Gregory, “The Good Samaritan and the Bad:
The Anglo American Law", Kadcliffe. ed.. The Good Samaritan and the Law  (1966) 23 at 38.
m Supra, at 313.
""Dworkin, supra, footnote 2 at 165.
11 'Supra, footnote 51.
u'2Sul/er the Children, supra, footnote 1. ch. 14.
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One way out o f this dilemma is to argue that the proposed change is 
a politically ripe part o f  an evolving pattern that over the long haul is 
headed toward consistency. In short, when public and official attention is 
focussed on a specific class o f injuries, the opportunity should be grasped 
for reform , even if it is only part o f the package eventually desired.113 This 
argument apparently assumes that the ultimate objective is a series o f special 
compensation schemes that together cover most or all accident victims. 
Alternatively, the incremental accumulation o f special plans might be seen 
as a halfway station on the way to a single comprehensive plan. T h e first 
prognosis could find support in the progressive evolution o f tort-replace- 
ment in Sweden.114 T h e  second seems to have been the lodestar o f the 
Pearson Commission in England.115 But there is no similar target even dimly 
evident in other countries like Japan, Germany, or the United States, which 
on occasion have adopted isolated special plans “where the shoe pinched 
most”.
On the other hand, there are those strenuously criticize special plans, 
not only for the horizontal inequity they entail, but for diverting efforts 
from enacting a system o f comprehensive social insurance. Accident victims, 
in their view, present the same social concern as do the disabled generally; 
indeed their need is much the same as that o f the retired, the unemployed, 
even the poor. For this set o f critics, therefore, the basic reform  strategy 
lies in reform ing the social security system.116 But pessimism about the 
public prospects o f such a retorm has caused some reform ers to narrow 
their focus. A first line o f retreat would be to limit compensation to the 
disabled, to the exclusion o f the unemployed, retired, eti., but including 
victims o f accident and disease, as recommended in 1974 by the Woodhouse 
Commission for Australia.117 More practical, however, is to retreat one more 
step and focus on accidents alone, like the New Zealand scheme which carne 
into force in 1974118 on the recommendation o f the celebrated original 
Woodhouse Report (1968).119 T h e principal attractions o f this more modest 
program include; (1) a sense by its supporters that accident victims (or
ll5Hellner, “Social Insurance and Tort Liability in Sweden", (1972) 16 Scand. St. L. 187, 194-7.
UiSuprn, footnote 22.
“ ’See especially Report I, ch. 11; supra, footnote 54. Even the New Zealand development (supra, footnote 
87) was progressive, since the scheme as originally enacted in 1972 excluded non-earners except with 
respect to motor accidents. The exclusion was eliminated in 1974, the cost being borne by a supplementary 
fund: in 1978/9 13% of total claims and 11.2% of total costs were attributable to this category.
ll6This group has been particularly vocal in Great Britain in criticism of the Pearson Report. See e.g. Allan,
Bourn and Holvoak, supra, footnote 2; Ogus Corheld & Harris, “Pearson: Principled Reform or Political 
Compromise", (1978) 7 Indust. L .J. 143; Ison, “The Politics of Reform", (1977) 27 U. Tor. L .J. 385; Lewis, 
“No-Fault Compensation for Victims o f Road Accidents: Can it be Justified?", (1981) 10 J .  Sor. Pol. 161; 
Lewis, “Tort and Social Security. T he Importance Attached to the Cause of Disability", (1980) 43 Mod. I. 
Rev. 514 deploring the recommendation to retain the industrial injury preference.
" ’ Report o f the National Committee o f Inquiry, Compensation and Rehabilitation in Australia.
[x*Supra, footnote 92.
'^Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, Compensation for Personal Injury in Neu' Zealand (1968).
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perhaps the disabled generally) are specially deserving as compared with 
others; (2) a political judgm ent that this package is more saleable (injury 
is the cause o f incapacity in at most 10% o f cases120); and (3) a conviction 
that the most urgent need and most practical first step is to replace the tort 
system and, essentially, extend workers’ compensation coverage around the 
clock.121 Rather than get into the deeper waters o f  national medical care 
and income maintenance for all, the New Zealand approach stays within 
the general scope o f experience with accidents.122
T h e advantages o f such broad-based schemes are several. Perhaps most 
important is that they finally shed all vestiges o f concern with the source 
o f the victim’s accident, in contrast to special plans whose limited coverage 
still compels inquiry into the precise nature o f the accident, not dissimilar 
to the tort system’s inquiry into fault and causal responsibility. They there­
fore promise relatively few “boundary” issues. Bitter experience with work­
ers’ compensation testifies to the persistent problem o f determining whether 
a given injury was suffered as a result o f  an “accident arising out o f and 
in the course o f employment” rather than some extraneous cause. Com­
pensation plans for medical injury have foundered on the difficulty o f 
devising administratively workable tests for excluding claimants whose 
worsening condition was due merely to the unavoidable progression o f 
disease.123 That the dividing line between accident and illness is particularly 
perplexing in the area o f medical treatment also emerges from the brief 
New Zealand experience.124 It likewise affects the scope o f defining the 
coverage o f drug compensation plans.125 I f  general compensation plans 
largely avoid such inquiries, they offer administrative saving which can 
sharply reduce overhead costs.
l20O f these 10% occur on the road, 25% at work and the remainder elsewhere (“bathtubs") according to 
the Pearson Report II, t. 2 & 4.
m Extension of workers’ compensation to 24 hours coverage for employees was advocated by R. Henderson, 
“Should Workers’ Compensation be Extended to Non-Occupaiional Injuries". (1969) 48 Tex. L. Rev. 117. 
In 1978, 76% of all accidental deaths and 59% of injuries occurred o ff the job (National Saletv Council, 
Accident Facts (1979) 25). Bernzweig, supra, footnote 99, makes the case for comprehensive injury reparation 
against the background o f the present very inadequate social security.
l22Not that the exclusion ol disability from sickness has passed without criticism or resentment. Why, it is 
asked, should one who has suffered an accident through his own fault, perhaps even a criminal act, fare 
better than one who is stricken by a crippling disease- Palmei, supra, footnote 90, ch. X IX , and Ison, supra,
footnote 90, ch. 2, both argue in favor of extending the scheme to include diseases or at least upgrading
sickness benefits under social security.
l25The Pearson Report 1 § 1348 ff. rejected a no-fault plan for all medical injury on this ground. The problem 
is explored by R. Keeton, “Compensation for Medical Accidents", (1973) 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 590; Havighurst, 
“Medical Adversity Insurance: Has its Time Come?", (1975) Duke L .J. 1233.
l21“Medical Mishap" is specifically included in the definition o f “accident.” See e.g., Hughes, “Accident 
Compensation and Childbirth", (1981) N.Z.L.J. 79; Osborne. "Inform ed Consent to Medical Treatment 
and the Accident Compensation Act 1972”, (1979) N.Z.L.J. 198. The difficulty o f attributing birth defects 
to medical mishaps led the Australian Commission, supra, footnote 114, to recommend the inclusion ol all 
“congenital defects" in the Australian scheme: Luntz, Compensation and Rehabilitation, (1975) 49.
m E.g. should it cover misprescription bv physicians? See supra, footnote 33.
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Special plans are sometimes claimed to be preferable to general com ­
pensation plans because they concentrate the cost o f accidents on the sources 
that ought to bear them. This cost internalization is then said to promote 
social values we have already canvassed: stimulating safety, achieving the 
optimum amount o f accident-causing activity and serving justice by making 
those pay who benefit from the activity. But as already pointed out, it is 
very doubtful that most special plans can effectively further these goals in 
a world such as ours where regulatory regimes, market pressures, and 
market imperfections largely obliterate whatever marginal impact such a 
plan might otherwise have had on safety and general allocative efficiency. 
Besides, the financing mechanisms o f general accident compensation plan 
could be used to promote the same objectives.1-'’ Some plans envisage that 
charges be levied on particular accident-causing activities, and over time 
the agency in charge presumably could refine its targeting in both sensible 
and fair ways. Such a general plan would then begin to look very much 
like a fully integrated and complete series o f separate plans, in genuine 
contrast to one that simply looked to payroll tax for its financing. T h e 
lesson here is that financing arrangements are a vital aspect o f this debate.
CONCLUSION
Special compensation plans for drug injuries have been the result o f  
strong public emotion over specific calamities like the thalidomide tragedy, 
rather than expressions o f a comprehensive public policy program for 
disability compensation. Indeed the credentials for singling out these un­
fortunates for preferential treatment are hardly impressive. It is at best 
arguable that the traditional tort regime, especially the negligence doctrine, 
suffers from more than average defects in its application to drug injuries 
because o f difficulties over causation, access to evidence, the exclusion o f 
development risks. More debatable still is whether such a reform would 
appreciably advance the cause o f accident prevention or the efficient al­
location o f resources. -Its most troublesome aspect, is how to justify pref­
erential treatment to victims o f drug in juries over other, somewhat similarly 
situated victims o f  accident or disease.
From a compensatory point o f view, the traditional tort system is most 
vulnerable to criticism for conditioning compensation on the fault o f the 
injurer rather than the merits o f the victim. But while special compensation
l?6Sec Craig, “Deterrence and Accident Compensation", (1978) 17 I'M'. Ont. L. Rn<. 111. In New Zealand, 
for example, the Motor Vehicle fund is administered and financed separately from the Earners’ Fund. In 
other respects, howeveer, the New Zealand planners have evinced little faith in the efficacy o f financial 
deterrents. Thus contributions to the Motor Vehicle fund are at a flat rate and even levies on employers 
for the Earners’ Fund (principally for industrial accidents) ignore experience rating: Ison, supra, footnote 
90 at 127-34. This skeptical altitude is also shared by and large in Britain: see e.g., Ativah, "Accident 
Prevention and Variable Premium Rates for Work-Connected Accidents”, (1975) 4 India. L .J. I. 89. How­
ever, Berkowitz, an American economist advocates variable rates: The Economics of Work Accidents in New 
Zealand (1979).
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plans eliminate this horizontal inequity, they create a new one by confining 
their preferential treatment to victims o f a specific cause, in this instance 
to victims o f drugs alone. Advocates o f comprehensive accident compen­
sation must therefore view special plans for drug victims, as for any other 
limited category o f claimants, with mixed enthusiasm.
